Economic conventions: essays in institutional evolution

The common property of the difficulty situations fundamental to these examples is the desirability in every case for a person to conform to the pattern of behavior followed by the majority of individuals. If you assume the majority of individuals to drive to the right, you’d wish to do so yourself to be able to avoid collisions. When planning a longer stay in a foreign land, you’d prefer to have made an investment in the community language so that you can be understood. And you would prefer to retain shops of goods that other people will accept in exchange-such as used the case with Kent brand cigarettes, however evidently no other brand of cigarettes, in the Romanian black market.


1.1 Introduction
1.2 Conventions and Game Theory
1.2.1 Coordination Games
1.2.2 Equilibrium Refinements
1.2.3 Conventional Behavior as Bounded Rationality
1.2.4 Conventions Minimize Transaction Costs
1.3 Explaining the Emergence of Conventions
1.3.1 The Spontaneous Order Tradition
1.3.2 Desiderata for Evolutionary Explanations
1.4 Evolutionary Games
1.4.1 Game Theory and Optimization
1.4.2 Evolutionarily Stable Strategies
1.4.3 Evolution Does Not Imply Efficiency
1.5 A Summary of the Rest of the Thesis
1.5.1 Language
1.5.2 Property
1.5.3 Money
1.5.4 The Firm
2 Language
2.1 Introduction
2.2 The Problematic Intuition
2.3 Signaling Systems
2.6 Natural Language
2.4 Signaling as an Equilibrium Refinement
2.5 Examples and Anomalies
3 Property
3.1 Introduction
3.2 Baboons
3.2.1 Symmetric “Hawk and Dove”
3.2.2 “Hawk and Dove” with Recognizable Role Asymmetry
3.3 Gold-Diggers
3.3.1 Players and Strategies
3.3.2 The “Veil of Uncertainty”
3.3.3 Interaction and Payoffs
3.4 Equilibrium
3.4.1 A Classification of Social States
3.4.2 An Equilibrium Concept
3.4.3 Equilibria
3.5 Evolutionary Dynamics
3.6 Concluding Remarks
5 The Firm
4 Money
4.2 The Emergence of Media of Exchange
4.3 Media of Exchange as Conventions
4.4 The Static Model
4.5 A Positive Approach to Dynamics
4.6 The Evolutionary Model
4.7 Concluding Remarks
5.2 The Cost of Market Transactions
5.2.1 The Coase-Dahlman Transaction Cost Concept
5.2.2 Coordination Problems and Transaction Costs
5.2.3 A Division of Labor Problem……….

Source: Stockholm School of Economics

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