This dissertation consists of two essays, which address the question of how social interactions shape economic outcomes. The first essay examines crime and criminal networks. The second one studies immigration, assimilation, and ethnic enclaves. The first essay offers a formal model of crime. Criminals often do not act alone. Rather, they form networks of collaboration…
Contents
1 Crime Networks
1.1 Introduction
1.2 Setup of the Game
1.3 The Game: Strategic Criminal Effort Choices
1.4 Decentralized Link Formation
1.4.1 Pairwise Stability
1.4.2 Policy Interventions
1.5 Larger Populations of Criminals
1.5.1 Equilibrium Crime in Large Populations
1.5.2 Pairwise Stable Networks in Large Populations
1.6 Conclusion
2 Immigration, Assimilation and Ethnic Enclaves
2.1 Introduction
2.2 A Game of Residential Clustering
2.2.1 Setup
2.2.2 The Game: Residential Location Choice
2.3 A Game with Residential and Entrepreneurial Clustering
2.3.1 Setup
2.3.2 The Game: Residential and Workplace Decisions
2.4 Conclusion
A Proofs of Propositions of Chapter 1
B Proofs of Propositions of Chapter 2
Bibliography
Author: Perez Rojas, Nathalia
Source: University of Maryland
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