Microinsurance : A Case Study in Cambodia

This dissertation is the outcome of a minor field research carried out during January through March 2008 in rural Cambodia. The research placed the microinsurance scheme run by a French non-government corporation in Cambodia under examination. Particularly, the existence of a small problem with asymmetric information, and specifically with adverse selection was researched. In an effort to determine a possible problem with adverse selection the change in consumption patterns following a surprise premium increase has been looked at. The data employed for the evaluation addresses a ten month period in which the last day of the fifth month marks the day for when the policy change was implemented. It was then the period prior to the strategy change which was considered with regards to the period following the strategy change. In an effort to determine that there are was no major factors affecting the findings within the test group a control group was examined parallel through the entire work. The carried out tests could not at a major level be utilized as proof of adverse selection; nevertheless, this is believed be mostly because of the limited time period for which data was available.


1. Introduction
2. Situation in Cambodia
2.1 Present situation
2.2 Health care
3. Sky – Cambodia
4. Theoretical and empirical background
4.1 Microinsurance
4.2 Health insurance
4.3 Asymmetric Information
4.3.1 Moral hazard
4.3.2 Adverse selection
6. Method and Hypothesis
6.1 Empirical strategy and theoretical models
6.2 Data and comparability
7. Empirical testing
7.1 Hypothesis 1: Correlation between being insured and utilizing health care
7.2 Hypothesis 2: Testing for change in mean consumption
7.3 Hypothesis 3: Test for an increase in consumption as a result of the policy change
7.8 Further comment on drop out data
8. Conclusion and discussion…..

Source: Stockholm School of Economics

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