Concepts: Taking Psychological Explanation Seriously

What do we need a theory of concepts for? Two answers to this ‘meta-level’ question about concepts figure prominently in the recent philosophical literature, namely, that concepts are needed primarily for the purposes of psychological explanation, and that concepts are needed primarily for the purposes of normative epistemology. I argue that the psychological perspective leads to what I call ‘Judgment Pragmatism’, which is a version of conceptual/inferential role semantics according to which concepts are not constitutively tied to rationality and knowledge. I begin in Chapter 1 by distinguishing two uses of the term ‘concept’ found in the literature, and laying out some constraints on any adequate theory of concepts…

Author: Rives, Bradley

Source: University of Maryland

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